

CPYRGHT

CIA's Low Repute On Campuses Hinders Its Hiring of Scholars

Academic-Type Studies Account
For Much of Agency's Work;
Rules on Publishing Relaxed

By HERBERT E. MEYER

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON — "What the hell do they want—a stupid CIA?"

The outburst from an official of the Central Intelligence Agency expresses a growing Washington worry—that continuing opposition on American college campuses will impair the CIA's ability to provide the President with first-rate analyses of global developments.

It's widely known, of course, that reports of the CIA's clandestine financial aid to young people for travel behind the Iron Curtain, along with general anti-Government sentiment aroused by the Vietnam war, have made the agency extremely unpopular among college students. A CIA employee can expect rough treatment should his presence become known when he visits a campus to study or to brainstorm with faculty members. Less publicized but just as upsetting to some CIA officials is the increasing difficulty of recruiting high-quality thinkers from those faculties to serve stints with the agency.

That's what's behind the CIA policy reversal that now allows its agents to write books and magazine articles in which the authors' affiliation is clearly spelled out. Let their academic prowess be displayed, the thinking goes, and the agency's tarnished image among American scholars will be bright-

men deplore the unreal picture created by TV and paperback tales of espionage and hero-do. Though the real CIA has its moments of 007-style operations, they say, the bulk of its work would bore a James Bond type—yet is vital to the country.

Watching the World

Is the Soviet economy stagnating or booming, and will the trend continue? Are the nations of Southeast Asia apt to move closer to a China orbit or farther away? In what East European country is a liberal policy most likely to develop? The CIA is supposed to know what's going on in every country and what's likely to happen next.

You can't simply send in a spy and expect him to bring back the answers, the agency says. (In fact, "It's a safe bet that the Russians have their own people trying to figure out what happens next in Eastern Europe," one official remarks.) Instead, specialists comb through mountains of published material and transcribed broadcasts for scraps of information that might be pieced into an illuminating picture.

The work these scholars do at the CIA is not unlike the work they would do on a university faculty, except that their findings are passed along to the White House and State Department rather than to students and colleagues. Just as a businessman may go on leave from his company to work a few years for the Defense or State Department, so may a scholar take leave from his classroom to work for the CIA.

But the agency's bloody reputation for spying and revolution is deterring academic experts from taking the plunge. According to some university instructors (who prefer not to be identified), their administrators have passed the word that requests for time off to work for the CIA will be frowned upon. Says an instructor in Latin American affairs on a Midwestern faculty: "They've let us know we wouldn't be leaving with their blessings."

Under Suspicion

Going back to the campus after a CIA stint can be a problem, too. The feeling persists that there's no such thing as a former intelligence officer—that once a spook, always a spook. Thus, ex-CIA men are saddled with the suspicion that they're not entirely independent and that they may still have secret links with their former employer.

The agency's effort to erase these stigmas by permitting staff members to be openly identified when they write is already under way. One of the agency's China scholars, Charles Neuhauser, will soon publish, through Harvard University, a paper based on work he did while on a CIA study assignment at Harvard's East Asian Research Center. CIA Soviet experts William Hyland and Richard Wallace Shryock wrote the book *The Fall of Khrushchev*.

The agency says that these publications are in no way "official" CIA documents; they are independent work by employees and don't necessarily reflect the CIA's conclusions, just as publications by private scholars don't always jibe with university policy. The Khrushchev authors stress that they limited their source material to Russian newspapers and other journals—public information available to any private scholar with the time and talent to analyze it.

Universities are ideal sources of such talent, so the CIA tries to maintain close ties with the academic community. But it isn't easy. Says one bitter CIA official: "They kick us off campuses and tell us we're sick. But people afraid to work for their Government because they think it may hurt their careers—that's sick."

Public Request By CIA Is Modest

If you can believe the Federal Budget, the Central Intelligence Agency is going out of business this year, thereby saving the Government \$183,000.

The spy agency's lone appearance in the fat budget book shows just one outlay in the current fiscal year, \$183,000 for "construction of a classified printing facility." Since there is no expenditure mentioned under this heading for the accounting year that begins in July, it must be assumed that the facility is nearing completion.

Precisely what goes on at the "facility" is, of course, secret. Friends of James Bond might assume that it manufactures fake passports and

See REQUEST, A13, Col. 1

forges currencies of countries that CIA is or is planning to penetrate. Friends of CIA might say, simply, that it is a "printing plant."

Anyone that thinks the Langley, Va., operation is really folding is naive, however. The agency's budget, thought to run to at least \$2 billion dollars, is buried in items for the Defense Department and other Federal agencies.

Another unbelievable statistic is the reported total of \$16 billion for interest charges on the Government's bonds and other debt instruments. This marvelous number is simultaneously too high and too low.

It is too high because an estimated \$5.4 billion of interest will be paid on securities held by the Federal Reserve banks and Government trust funds. This sum will flow back to the Federal treasury.

It is probably too low because the Treasury conventionally assumes that the price it will have to pay for new borrowings is the same as the current rate for money. Since the Federal Reserve is squeezing the supply of credit, interest rates will more likely continue to rise. The Government, like any home buyer, will thus have to pay more for its debt. To be sure, the central bank usually overdoes these things, and later on in the year, may have to reverse its ground and bring interest rates down. Then, the Government's borrowing costs will decline, too.

One of the more meaningful, if little noticed budget figures, is the outlay for civilian capital expenditures. This includes schools, sewers, health buildings, and the like.

Such spending is supposed to create assets with a long life as opposed to the outlays for daily, operating expenses.

The new budget estimates such capital spending in the civil sphere at \$30 billion, up \$1.4 billion from the past year and a bit more than 15 per cent of the total Federal budget. The increase is almost entirely accounted for by enlarged spending for education, training and health.

One item that is barely growing this year is Federal employment. The number of full-time civilian employees is expected to reach 2,693,508, a gain of only 42,797 over the previous year. Congress has ordered the Government to cut its payrolls back to the level of four years ago and this is a major reason for the holddown.

The Post Office will put on another 11,000 employees, but there is no guarantee that the steady decline in its service will be arrested.

The Agency for International Development will lose 700 of its 16,600 workers and that tells its own little story about the Nation's shrinking involvement abroad in what is regarded as good works.

The Federal payroll—civilian and military—is listed as rising \$1.2 billion to \$46.1 billion. This presumably includes the 250,000 part-time workers not counted in the total of 2.7 million Federal employees. But it does not include the \$2.8 billion pay increase that Congress has voted for both military and civilian workers.

CPYRGHT

Helms Denies CIA Role in Mission of Pueblo

Associated Press

Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, denies that the CIA had anything to do with the mission of the USS Pueblo.

"Neither this agency nor I personally have had anything to do with the mission of the USS Pueblo, the ship itself or any of its crew," Helms said in a letter to Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.).

CPYRGHT

The Federal Diary

THE WASHINGTON POST Wednesday, March 12, 1969

B13

Early Bird Finch Gets Stopped at Nest

By Williard Clopton Jr.
and Mike Causey

Some Federal officials are suspicious of people who come to work early. For that, and for reasons of building security, a number of Government agencies now require passes or identification from employees who arrive early, or leave after the regular quitting time.

Monday morning, about 8:30, an early bird at Health, Education and Welfare was going through the check-your-pass-and-sign-in-please ritual. He wasn't due on the job for half an hour.

While the civil servant and the building guard were completing their business, a tall man breezed past them, heading down a hall toward some elevators.

The guard called out for the tall man to show his pass. He turned around and confessed that he didn't have one, but that he was the Secretary of HEW, and would that do?


The guard then recognized his new boss, Robert Finch, and said he could proceed.

As he continued down the hall the Secretary turned to a man walking behind him and said: "I guess I'm not too visible around here!" He didn't have any trouble getting past the guard yesterday.

General Services Administration workers at Crystal Mall say the elevators are at it



Clopton



Causey

again. The six elevators in Building No. 4 are working, employees note, but they seem to be programmed for express trips to the 11th floor.

People in between floors one and 11 find it takes awhile for an elevator to stop at their level. Most of GSA's top officials work on the 11th floor.

Social call: A stranger made his way past the well-tended portals of the Central Intelligence Agency's Langley, Va., preserve the other day, but it wasn't a security breakdown. It was just President Nixon, making another in his series of personal visits to Federal agencies—in this case, his first stop at a non-Cabinet level department.

His talk to CIA employees was mostly serious. He praised them for doing well a difficult and necessary task without receiving the kind of public acclaim they might get in other agencies.

As has been the case throughout his exploration of the bureaucracy, he also pro-

voked some chuckles. He told this story:

"The first time President Eisenhower came out here to lay the cornerstone, he couldn't find the CIA or the building. So he ordered a sign be put up, 'The Central Intelligence Agency.'"

"Then when President Kennedy came out in 1961 he saw the sign and he ordered it taken down because, after all, if it is the CIA it should not be so well advertised.

"So that leaves me with somewhat of a dilemma. I usually have said as I have gone to the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Agriculture, and all the others, 'It is a pleasure to be here.'"

"But the CIA is not supposed to be here. So I suppose what I am supposed to say now is, it is a pleasure not to be here."

Dedication: Postal Record tells of the harrowing experience of a Groton, Conn., postman who saw a crow making off with a letter he'd just placed in a rural mailbox.

"After chasing the crow several hundred feet down the road and over the fence, the chagrined carrier finally

caused the bird to drop the letter, which he personally delivered to the patron."

The elusive missive, it turned out, contained a firm announcement of the closing of a local store. Remarks the Journal: "Who knows what would have happened if the patron would not have learned this information?"

Checkup: During 1968, health units of the U.S. Public Health Service's Division of Federal Employee Health screened 40,000 workers and turned up nearly 4,000 cases of previously undetected physical ailments. The conditions included cancer, diabetes, and glaucoma.

There's hope: The GOP Newsletter reports that 47 members of Congress are former journalists. There are 184 with business or banking experience, 73 teachers, and 50 farmers. Well over half, 389, are service veterans and 310 are lawyers.

Joseph P. Smith Jr., who during his career oversaw the sale of more than \$100 million worth of real estate in three Atomic Energy Commission communities, has retired from the Department of Housing and Urban Development after 38 years in government.

President Praises CIA As Instrument of Peace

By Carroll Kilpatrick
Washington Post Staff Writer

President Nixon went to the defense of the Government's most secret and defenseless agency yesterday and said that it is "one of the great instruments" for preserving peace.

He was talking about the Central Intelligence Agency in the CIA auditorium before an unusually appreciative and demonstrative audience.

But the CIA employes outdid most of the others in the enthusiasm of their welcome and the Chief Executive was unreserved in his praise of the clandestine agency's work.

The President later flew to Florida, telling reporters en route that he planned a long weekend of rest, relaxation and study of a briefcase full of reports and memoranda on the Sentinel anti-ballistic missile program.

At his televised news conference Tuesday, Mr. Nixon said that he would announce his decision early next week on whether to go ahead with a limited ABM system.

During his talk to CIA employes, the President said the agency has a mission that "runs counter to some of the deeply held traditions in this

country. The American people don't like war. They don't like secrecy. They don't like cold war."

But he said that "it is necessary for those who make decisions at the highest level to have the very best possible intelligence so that the margin of error will to that extent be reduced."

The American people should understand, he said, that the CIA "is a necessary adjunct of the Presidency." He quoted a message former President Truman sent the CIA calling it "absolutely necessary to any President of the United States—from one who knows."

"I know, and I appreciate what you do," Mr. Nixon added.

Presents Medals

The President told the CIA officials that he had had "the great honor" earlier in the day to present Medals of Honor to three Army enlisted men.

There will be no medals and no recognition for heroic work done by CIA officials, he said.

"Your successes will never be made public and your failures will always be public," he said.

"I recognize that, and I am deeply grateful to those of

you who make that kind of sacrifice."

The President presented his first Medals of Honor at an East Room ceremony to Staff Sgt. Joe R. Hooper of Saugus, Calif., Spec. 5 Clarence E. Sasser of Rosharon, Tex., and Sgt. Fred W. Zabitosky of Trenton, N.J., for heroic service in Vietnam.

These soldiers, the President said, are "men who faced death and instead of losing their courage gave courage to their fellow men."

Later, the President met with the Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy and named a task force to investigate "dramatic" increases in Douglas fir and plywood prices.

Budget Director Robert P. Mayo was named chairman of the task force to identify the causes of the price increases, to recommend immediate corrective action, and to recommend a long-term policy to facilitate supply and demand adjustments in the industry.

Press Secretary Ronald L. Ziegler said that fir and plywood prices had increased from 30 to 92 per cent in a year's time, causing inflationary pressures in the whole construction industry.

The President met with Liberian Vice President William Richard Tolbert, who is in the country to attend a meeting of the World Baptist Alliance.

Nomination of Governor

In another action, the President announced that he would nominate Peter A. Bove, a one-time Republican candidate for Governor of Vermont and since 1957 comptroller of the Virgin Islands, as Governor of the islands.

If confirmed, Bove will succeed Ralph M. Palewonsky, a



CLAYTON FRITCHEY

Domestic Image of CIA Brightens

The Central Intelligence Agency may not be living quite as dangerously these days as it used to, but its reputation, in the United States at least, is improving, and this has been helped along by the revelation that it was not, as widely thought, responsible for the Pueblo's spy mission off North Korea.

After its U2 flights over Russia and other James Bond-like Cold War episodes, it was natural to suspect that the CIA was in charge of the special intelligence unit aboard the Pueblo. It now appears, however, that it was controlled by the Pentagon's super-secret National Security Agency, and that CIA had nothing to do with it.

So much suspicion has been aroused by CIA activities in recent years, though that many are ready to believe any story about it, no matter how improbable. The most recent instance is District Attorney Jim Garrison's reckless charges that the agency was involved in the assassination of John F. Kennedy.

Unfortunately for the CIA, its image can be damaged by boastful friends as well as enemies. Former White House Assistant Eric Goldman's new book on Lyndon Johnson provides an astonishing example of that.

As 1966 wore on, and Congressional opposition to the Vietnam war intensified, the former president, Goldman says, became convinced that "the Russians were in constant touch with anti-war senators — and he named names. These senators ate lunch and went to parties at the Soviet Embassy, children of their staff people dated Russians."

Goldman quotes Johnson as saying to him, and to a Cabinet member and two other White House officials, "The Russians think up things for the senators to say. I often know before they do what their speeches are going to say." Goldman says he was "staggered." When he questioned the President's statement, the latter "extolled" the CIA and FBI because "they

kept him informed about what was 'really going on'."

It is hard to believe these agencies were feeding that kind of information to Johnson, or that they were spying on U.S. senators. It seems more likely that the President was indulging himself in one of his occasional tantrums and cited the CIA and FBI to dramatize and fortify his point.

It is true that the present director of the CIA, Richard Helms, came to power in June 1966, and got off to a shaky start by publicly congratulating a newspaper for an editorial attack on Sen. J. W. Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the leading critic of Johnson's Vietnam policy.

But in the light of Helms' subsequent performance, this would seem to have little significance. As the director of CIA he has impressed a number of senators, including Fulbright, with his relative detachment about Vietnam. He has not struck them as a fanatical cold warrior.

As a result, the agency has recently enjoyed a better standing domestically, but elsewhere in the world it is still the favorite whipping boy of governments which have learned they can get away with blaming anything on it.

In Russia the CIA has even been blamed for the sour notes of famous visiting U.S. orchestras. The agency was actually accused of planting men in the orchestras who were better spies than musicians, with the result that the performances were not up to par.

In Yugoslavia, the CIA was subjected to such absurd charges that Borba, its leading newspaper put its tongue in cheek and solemnly informed its readers that the CIA was not responsible for the recent drop in the price of imported whiskey.

Sen. Fulbright also put his tongue in cheek when he suggested that the U.S. and Russia simply freely exchange the intelligence information each now gather at immense effort and expense as well as great risk.

"It would save us both a lot of money. If we quit mulling everything and made it pub-

lic," Fulbright said. He admitted his proposal did have one possible drawback: "Finding out things surreptitiously," he said, "is the only way it's credible to intelligence agents."

ORIGINAL

JB
2

FAULTY MARS SHOT BY SOVIET HINTED

Failure Shortly After Asian
Blast-Off Is Reported

By PETER GROSE

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 27—

An unmanned Soviet spacecraft bound for Mars is believed to have failed shortly after blast-off early today at the central Asian space launching station.

This would mark a further setback to the Soviet program of interplanetary exploration, which, despite its high priority in Soviet space planning, has been plagued with difficulties since the first attempts to reach Mars in 1960.

The Soviet authorities have not announced the latest reported abortive Mars attempt, but fragmentary information available to Western monitors suggests that trouble arose through ignition failure of the second or third stage of the spacecraft.

First reports suggested some possibility of an explosion on or close to the launching pad of the Baikonur space station. This was not confirmed by later information, which pointed more to failure after launching, causing the spacecraft to tumble back to earth.

Analysts said the reported launching failure would have only a negligible effect on the Russians' manned space program, since an entirely different type of spacecraft was apparently involved.

Partial Success in 1965

Recent Soviet attempts to reach Mars have been carried out by spacecraft of the Zond series. After a total of six known failures during 1960, 1962 and 1964, the Russians achieved a partial success in 1965 when the Zond 2 spacecraft passed within 1,000 miles of Mars. A failure in the solar cells that power the spacecraft's sensing equipment, however, meant that the craft was out of communication for most of its journey through space.

The earlier failures are believed to have been a result of difficulties in the upper stages of the rockets. In 1962, five attempts to reach Mars and Venus were aborted from failures in the third or fourth stages, leaving the instrument-packed payloads in earth orbit.

These difficulties seem to have been solved in the smaller 2,500-pound spacecraft that the Russians have been using in their exploration of Venus.

Two Venus-bound craft are now midway in so far successful flights aimed at achieving soft landings on Venus on May 16 and 17. They were launched five days apart in early January.

The Russians have already achieved one soft landing on Venus on Oct. 18, 1967.

Western analysts are awaiting word of a major new Soviet step in rocket technology, the launching of a giant booster rocket that United States officials believe will be far larger than the American Saturn V. The first of this new series of rockets is known to have been ready for launching for several weeks.

Contrary to the immediate conclusion on hearing of today's reported launching failure, information now available to scientific analysts indicates that this giant new rocket was not involved in today's Mars attempt.

Ironically, the United States has had more success in exploration of Mars than the Russians. Though such interplanetary attempts have had lower priority in the American space program than the manned flights.

The first United States attempt to approach Mars was a success. This was the flight of Mariner 4 in 1965. This spacecraft passed within 6,000 miles of the planet, transmitting back to earth 21 photographs.

The next American Mars flights are only now under way. Mariner 6 launched on Feb. 24 and Mariner 7, launched today. If all goes well, these two spacecraft will pass within 2,000 miles of Mars in August, sending back telemetric data that could indicate whether or not there is water vapor in the Martian atmosphere.

The first American attempt to make a soft landing on Mars, the Viking project, is scheduled for 1973. There are no American plans for exploration of Venus.

U.S. Is Dismantling Peshawar Spy Base

By William J. Coughlin
Los Angeles Times

PESHAWAR, West Pakistan, April 9—The American spy base here still is so secret that the U.S. Air Force refuses to talk about the problems of dismantling it.

Pakistan announced last May it had notified the United States it would have to vacate the base at the expiration of its ten-year lease this coming July 1.

Since then, the removal of acres of towers and antennas, infrared scanners, long-range radars and electronic listening

equipment has been under way.

Some of the information previously relayed from the base now is obtained from orbiting U.S. spy satellites.

Peshawar hit world headlines in 1960, when an American reconnaissance U-2 flown by Francis Gary Powers was shot down inside the Soviet Union. Powers refueled at Peshawar before taking off on his high-flying penetration of Soviet airspace. The Soviet border is only 150 miles from here.

Communications Link

Peshawar, though, was not a U-2 base. When the ten-year lease establishing it was signed on July 18, 1959, it was identified as a link in a worldwide U.S. communications network which could serve Far East and Middle East members of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Pakistan was a member of both organizations.

The strategically located base was, however, a highly sophisticated and computerized listening post to eavesdrop on electronic communications within the Soviet Union and China. From here, tape recordings could be made of missile countdowns, military conversations, civilian radiotelephone communications and other electronic emanations from Central Asia.

At the time the agreement was signed, Pakistan was closely tied to the U.S. by defense alliances and military aid programs. When American military aid to Pakistan was cut off in 1965 after the 22-day war with India broke out, the picture changed.

Pakistan's government turned first to the Chinese and, last year, to the Soviets for military equipment. The only military equipment now purchased from the U.S. consists of spare parts and nonlethal items.

The original lease on the base provided for a ten-year extension with either party having the option to cancel at a year's notice.

Last April, Soviet Premier Kosygin visited Pakistan. In May, it was announced the base agreement would not be renewed.

In early July the Soviet Union disclosed it had agreed to supply arms to Pakistan. There is reason to believe those events were related. Neither China nor Russia could have been pleased about the U.S. intelligence-gathering operation on their doorstep. Kosygin may well have used the lever of military assistance to bring about its removal.

Once-Busy Base

More than 3000 Americans were stationed here at one time. Although base officials refused to discuss the evacuation timetable, the local talk is that at least half of the Americans have left.

The American Embassy in Rawalpindi, which maintains a noncommittal attitude on the spy base 108 miles distant, has arranged auctions of household goods for those American families at Peshawar departing for home. Advertisements of the auctions appear in the Rawalpindi newspapers.

Many of the residents of Peshawar will be sorry to see the Americans leave. The GIs have left their economic imprint. As many as 300 Pakistanis once worked at the base, according to a former employee.

No announcement has been made as to final disposition of the base. Peshawar is a military stronghold of the Pakistanis, just as it was of the British. When the last American leaves, the former U.S. spy base most likely will become a Pakistani military installation.

What the Pakistanis will do with the base remains a mystery. A diamond remains a mystery.

CPYRGHT

U.S. Fears Chance of Sino-Soviet War Is Rising

Russia Reported Eying Strikes at

Chalmers M. Roberts

Washington Post Staff Writer


Reports reaching Washington relating to a possible Soviet strike at the Chinese nuclear complex have increased Nixon administration alarm about the chances of a war between the two Communist giants.

According to these reports, at least two in number, the Russians have been making discreet inquiries of some fellow Communist leaders, both those in power in Eastern Europe and some out of power in Western Europe, on what would be the reaction to such a Soviet strike. There are no reports on the responses.

It appears that the inquiries were first made at the world Communist gathering in Moscow last June and later repeated at another place. That could not be ascertained yesterday.

The reports are considered authentic but it is conceded that they might somehow have been surfaced as part of the Kremlin's psychological warfare against the Peking regime of Mao Tse-tung.

The rising tension between



August 28, 1969

Map of Soviet-Chinese border area shows locations of major border clashes this year as well as some of the

known Chinese sites known

China and the Soviet Union, most marked since the clashes on the Siberian border in March, has led American officials to draw up scenarios of what Moscow and Peking might do and what the United States reaction could be. It is

understood there has been a National Security Council study.

The sense of alarm over a possible war has been steadily rising in Washington for months. The border clash in

Central Asia considerably alarm.

One key of month earlier chances of Soviet fight

sher of the new magazine will be playing "a more important role" in the black movement.

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CPTRIGHT

Soviet Strikes at China A-Sites Hinted

BORDER, From A1

As viewed here there are at least three major possible Soviet tactics:

1. A punitive action such as an extensive border clash, initiated by Moscow as it is believed was the case last month in Central Asia, in which a large Chinese force would be destroyed by superior Soviet power.

2. Attempts to subvert the racial minority groups in Sinkiang on the Chinese side in Central Asia where anti-Peking feeling is thought to run high.

3. A preventive strike, by air or on the ground.

This latter, by far the most serious and thought likely to lead to major conflict if not all-out war, includes the strike at the Chinese nuclear complex about which the new reports are concerned. It is believed that such an attack would be with conventional bombs.

Perhaps the single most critical target in such a case would be the gaseous diffusion plant at Lanchow which makes the fissionable material for Chinese nuclear weapons.

However, the advantages that the Soviets enjoy in terms of logistics in Central Asia are thought to be missing in Siberia. There, in the Soviet Far East, the Soviets are dependent on the single double-track Trans-Siberian railway which runs close to the Chinese border in many places and which could be cut by raiding parties. This would be especially true in the long winter months when the Amur and Ussuri river borders are frozen.

It is the virtually unanimous view of those here who follow China that the Peking government would retaliate if there were a Soviet strike of any importance. But there is a divi-

sion of opinion as to whether Peking would use its nuclear weapons.

The Chinese lack a missile capability but do have a few Soviet-made bombers and many Soviet fighters that could be modified to carry bombs. The Soviets have mounted a massive defense in Siberia but there can be no guarantee that a plane or two would not get through. Such important Siberian cities as Blagoveshchensk, Khabarovsk and Vladivostok are barely on the Soviet side of the long border.

The Nixon administration had proclaimed a public policy of not taking sides in the Chinese-Soviet dispute but rather of trying to improve relations with both countries. Moscow and Peking, however, appear to remain suspicious that the United States will join the other against it.

There has been minimal official public comment here on the possibility of a Chinese-Soviet war. On Aug. 20, however, Secretary of State William P. Rogers told a group of college students that "our best judgment is that border clashes and incidents will continue" since "we are convinced that the hostility between them is deep." He expressed hope such clashes would not turn into a war.

Rogers went on to say that China watchers in Hongkong had told him the Soviets had the capability to "take over a good section of the country near Peking and probably Peking itself." However, it is widely felt here that the Soviets would shrink from such a major attack lest they become bogged down in a major land war in China much as were the Japanese in the pre World War II period.

Recent polemics from Moscow and Peking show the intensity of feeling. Soviet Com-

munist Party chief Brezhnev in June charged that China was preparing to wage "both an ordinary and a great nuclear war" and declared that the Soviet people "are not intimidated by shouting." Other Russians have rattled their own nuclear weapons.

Anatoly V. Kuznetsov, the prominent Soviet writer who recently defected in Britain, told the New York Times in London that the great fear of the ordinary Soviet citizen today is China. He said Russians fear a Chinese attack and believe war cannot be avoided. Even though Kuznetsov broke with his own government he put all the blame on the Chinese.

A Peking broadcast on Aug. 14 charged that the Soviets have "built a series of airbases and guided missile bases along the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian borders" and have "plotted to gather some of the satellite troops of the Warsaw Pact and organize them into so-called 'international columns' to oppose China."

The current issue of Peking Review contains a scathing denunciation of "the new Czars" in Moscow. It especially attacked Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko's recent friendly words about President Nixon's call for an "era of negotiation" to replace confrontation. Gromyko was charged with revering the Nixon formula and with having "prostrated himself before it."

Some Soviet watchers have concluded that the Kremlin leaders have decided there is no merit in waiting for Mao's death in hopes he would be followed by leaders who would repair the breach with Moscow.

It also is theorized here that Soviet military leaders have

been making the case that the Chinese before long will have an invulnerable nuclear capability and thus the time to strike is now. But earlier American estimates of Chinese nuclear development have proved to be overoptimistic, judging by known tests.

SOVIET TRADES 10 FOR SPY'S RETURN

West Germans Freed for
Man South Africa Held

BONN, Aug. 22 (Reuters)—Qualified sources said today that the Soviet Union had returned 10 captured West German agents in exchange for Yuri Nikolayevich Loginov, a Russian spy held in South Africa who is said to have betrayed the names of Soviet agents in many countries to the West.

The deal was proposed by the Russians and carried out a month ago, when Mr. Loginov was brought to Europe for the exchange, the official Western sources said.

No identification of the West Germans was provided. They were released from prisons in West Germany and, the sources said, "they rendered their country substantial services." Official spokesmen refused all comment on the exchange.

Despite the apparent imbalance of the exchange, the Russians got the better part of the bargain, the sources said. The latest exchange, coming a month after the repatriation of a Briton, Gerald Brooke, in exchange for the Soviet spies Peter J. and Helen Joyce Kroger, appears to be the end of a series of major spy exchanges.

In February Heinz Felfe, a Soviet double agent who penetrated the West German secret service, was returned to Moscow in exchange for three West German students held by the Russians.

A Western intelligence source said tonight, "After the Krogers and Felfe the Russians seem to have got nearly all the cows back in the cowshed."

The sources said the West Germans had played the central role in engineering the exchange, usually a complex procedure involving a secret rendezvous somewhere on the heavily guarded frontier between East and West Germany or at a crossing point at the Berlin wall.

The sources were unable to say last night what South Africa had secured from the deal. But it was noted here that Mr. Loginov was held for two years in South Africa without having been brought to trial.

One possibility was that the South Africans felt they had squeezed the Soviet agent dry of information and saw no useful purpose in having the affair aired in court.

Mr. Loginov, 36 years old,

was arrested in Johannesburg in 1967 after having entered the country on a Canadian passport under the name of Edmund Trinka. He was interrogated for weeks by security men and was said to have "sung like a canary."

The South African security

police chief, Maj. Gen. Hendric J. van den Bergh, said the spy had named Russian intelligence men around the world giving a long list of contacts he had made in 23 other countries.

Mr. Loginov's mission in South Africa was said to have

been an attempt to determine the extent of Rhodesia's dependence on South Africa as well as to find out how it was cooperating with another Western country — the name was withheld — in atomic and rocket research.

Around the World

Russians Make 10-for-1 Spy Swap

BONN—The Soviet Union has traded 10 West German agents for Yuri N. Loginov, a Russian spy held in South Africa who is said to have betrayed the names of many Soviet agents in the West, official Western sources told Reuters news agency.

It quoted a Western intelligence source as saying, "after the Krogers and Felde, the Russians seem to have got nearly all the cows back in the cowshed."

He was referring to the exchange of convicted Soviet spies Peter and Helen Kroger for British university don Gerald Brooke last month and the exchange in February of Heinz Felde, a Soviet double agent who penetrated the West German secret service, for three West German students.

The latest swap was proposed by the Russians and carried out a month ago when Loginov was brought to Europe for the exchange, officials said.

Despite the apparent imbalance, the Russians got the better part of the deal, the sources said. But they added that the 10 "rendered their country substantial services." Their identities were not revealed, but all were said to have been serving prison sentences in East Germany.

Loginov, 36, was arrested in Johannesburg in 1967 after entering South Africa with a Canadian passport and an alias. He was held for two years without trial and was said to have "sung like a ca-

nary," giving interrogators a list of his contacts in 23 countries.

C.I.A.-Planned Drive on Officials Of Vietcong Is Said to Be Failing

U.S. Sources Say Suspects
Are Often Freed by Local
Vietnamese Authorities

By TERENCE SMITH
Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Aug. 18—Operation Phoenix, a program designed by the United States Central Intelligence Agency to track down and eliminate Vietcong officials, is reported to be bogging down. American officials blame local accommodation by the South Vietnamese.

Officials in charge of the program acknowledge that fewer than 20 per cent of the 25,233 suspected agents and sympathizers who have been arrested have received prison sentences of a year or more.

More than 80 per cent have been released or permitted to escape by Vietnamese authorities at the local level, acquitted or given sentences of a few months or less.

Since American involvement in the program stops at the point of arrest, United States officials say they are unsure about what happens when the suspects are turned over to the local authorities.

"Many of them just go out the back door of the jail," said John Mason, the head of the American advisers to the program. "We know that."

Some Are Treated Favorably
"Favoritism is part of it," he said. "Sometimes family relationships are involved. We know very well that if one of the units picks up the district chief's brother-in-law, he's going to be released."

Bribery and payoffs are also part of the explanation, American officials maintain. In some cases there seems to be a subconscious sympathy on the part of the local authorities who understand that accommodation with the Vietcong is often the key to survival in the countryside.

In other cases the Vietnamese authorities have been reluctant to penalize a Vietcong cadre member who, as a result of a compromise settlement achieved at the Paris peace talks, might turn out to be a province official. Like many Vietnamese, the local authorities tend to hedge their bets.

This is said to result in a critical weakening of a program that American officials have been describing as the most ambitious intelligence-gathering effort ever mounted in South Vietnam.


C.I.A. Created Phoenix
Phoenix was conceived by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1967 and put into operation in July of 1968. The object was to identify, ferret out and dispose of the Vietcong "infrastructure," enemy agents, organizers, cadre members that exist in nearly every village and city in South Vietnam. The theory was that if these people could be eliminated, Vietcong and North Vietnamese units would be denied the vital indigenous support they have enjoyed in intelligence, supplies and personnel.

"Phoenix teams," composed of South Vietnamese intelligence officers, National policemen, soldiers and Government representatives, have been installed in all 44 provinces and most of the 222 districts and cities throughout the country. Each team has one or two American advisers—some 450 in all.

Some of the advisers are intelligence officers of the Special Forces, or Green Berets, but it is reliably reported that none of these are involved in the current case involving eight Special Forces soldiers who are facing possible murder charges in the death of a Vietnamese national.

The teams coordinate all available intelligence to compile a blacklist of Vietcong recruiters, supporters and sympathizers in a given area. Once the dossier on an individual is completed, a paramilitary unit is sent to the area to check for defect, or to arrest him or, if necessary, to kill him.

The arrested suspects are



Gen. William C. Westmoreland cordoned off villages in action now thought to be inferior to Operation Phoenix in detecting the enemy.

questioned intensively. If the local Vietnamese authorities believe there is sufficient evidence, a suspect is turned over to the provincial authorities. Many are released at this point, however.

After a period in the provincial jail ranging from one to four months, depending on the backlog, the suspects cases are put before the province security council. This quasi-judicial body is composed of the province chief, a local court judge and six law-enforcement officers. It is supposed to meet once a week and often considers 20 to 30 cases at a sitting.

As a rule neither suspects nor witnesses appear. A judgment is usually made on the basis of the written record of the investigation.

The suspect is not usually permitted a lawyer and frequently is not allowed to reach his family until the investigation is completed.

This procedure is acknowledged to result in a variety of abuses. Often the case against a suspect consists largely of intelligence indications rather than hard evidence. Despite this, if the security council regards the case as conclusive, the man is imprisoned.

System an Improvement

Harsh as this may seem, American officials insist that the technique is an improvement over the old "county fairs" operations conducted under Gen. (former United States commander in Vietnam) William C. Westmoreland, in which a whole village was cordoned off and screened and perhaps hundreds of people were detained with little semblance of due process. Now, the officials maintain, there is at least a quasi-judicial review of the evidence.

In theory, if the suspect is found to be a Vietcong organizer or official, he is supposed to be given a two-year sentence—the maximum without trial.

A number of reforms are being drafted to tighten the program and increase its effectiveness.

The teams will attempt to concentrate their efforts on Vietcong leaders—the so-called hard core—and ignore the rank and file. There will also be efforts to improve evidence-gathering techniques so that more conclusive cases can be presented to the security committees.

Regardless of how effective the reforms prove to be, the Phoenix program still stands a good chance of becoming obsolete overnight as a result of the Paris talks.

"If the negotiators reach an agreement in Paris," Mr. Mason said, "they will legitimize the very same people we are trying to round up. If they decide to give the Vietcong a role in the Government, the people we are hunting today may be in charge of delivering the mail or collecting the garbage tomorrow."

Moscow Reported Eying Raids on China A-Si

The State Department said today it has "heard rumors from time to time" that the Soviet Union may be considering bombing Chinese nuclear installations.

But, a department spokesman said, it still does not think the Soviet Union will attack China, although border clashes might continue and could flare up into larger conflicts than either side wants.


The spokesman, Robert J. McCloskey, was answering questions about "intelligence reports" saying Soviet leaders have sounded out allies and others on their reaction to a possible strike against China.

The reports had suggested the Soviet Union might attempt to destroy Chinese facilities for building nuclear weapons in Lanchow, Paotow, Lop Nor and elsewhere.

McCloskey replied, "We have heard that rumor from time to time." Asked whether it was a rumor or a report, he said he considered a report to be confirmed information but he would not argue how reliable this information was.

McCloskey said such rumors had been heard for "the last couple of months." It was understood from other sources that new information along the same

See SINO-SOVIET, Page A-6



Although they may look like giant beach balls or perhaps weather balloons they are really part of the sophisticated electronic gear aboard

the Soviet satellite-tracking vessel Kosm Valadimir Komarov. The ship is taking supplies at Halifax, Nova Scotia.

Contd

China Raid Plan Reported

Continued From Page A-1
lines had reached Washington within the last week.

McCloskey said the present judgment of the State Department is still that expressed by Secretary of State William P. Rogers on Aug. 20.

Remarks Called Inconclusive

Rogers was asked by a group of government summer interns whether he thought the Russians would attack China. He replied that the State Department's "best judgment is that probably the Soviets will not do that."

McCloskey said today that Roger's remarks could be taken to include the possibility of an air strike at Chinese nuclear installations.

United Press International reported earlier that the reports came from Communist sources of varying degrees of credibility—and say that Soviet leaders have been sounding out their Warsaw Pact partners, as well as some Communist party leaders in Western Europe, as to what their attitude would be if the Soviet Union had to take such an extreme step.

There have been six significant border clashes between the two countries this year, the most recent one coming two weeks ago.

And Moscow and Peking have escalated their war of words. The Soviet Communist party newspaper, Pravda, said today, for example, that Red China's "dangerous, recklessly adventurous attitude" toward war could lead to a nuclear world conflict.

New Chinese Arming Cited

"The military arsenals of the Maoists are being filled up with ... new arms," Pravda said. "No continent would be left out if a war flares up under the present conditions, with the existing present-day technology, with the availability of the lethal weapons and the up-to-date means of their delivery."

The assumption of those authorities here who tend to believe the reports of a possible air attack on China, is that the Soviet Union wants to determine whether such extreme action would cost it support within the international Communist community, particularly in Eastern Europe.

The reports all appear to be talking about a possible Soviet attack by bombers armed with

faced with a decision of whether to use nuclear weapons to halt the Chinese.

The information reaching Washington on Moscow's talks with Communist leaders in Eastern Europe and other countries fall into roughly three time periods:

- Just after the international Communist meeting in Moscow in June, reports began coming in from Communist sources that the Soviets had been telling delegates to the meeting that the Chinese threat was far greater than many of them realized, and the international Communist world should close ranks against Peking on the ideological front.

- A bit later, there were reports that Soviet officials had told Communist party leaders in various countries they believed China might escalate the border fighting, in which event Moscow

would have to "take military action." The action was not specified.

- The latest reports were that Soviet officials, in discussions with leaders of countries in Communist East Europe, had said that developments might ultimately force them to take action to destroy China's nuclear facilities.

Their argument was that although China has not proceeded very rapidly in deploying nuclear weapons, it is capable of doing so in a relatively short time if Peking decides on this course.

The Chinese are said to have a quantity of medium-range atomic warhead missiles, although they are not yet deployed. However, these could be placed in one to two years, and if they are aimed at Russia, this could vastly change the military situation.

U.S. DOUBTS SOVIET WILL BOMB CHINA

But It Heard Reports That
Moscow Considered Idea

By HEDRICK SMITH
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 28 — The State Department said today that it saw little likelihood of a Soviet air strike against Communist China's nuclear facilities, but it acknowledged that it had heard rumors that Moscow had sounded out Communist supporters elsewhere on this matter.

The Central Intelligence Agency was understood to have taken more seriously reports that Soviet officials had discreetly asked some fellow Communist leaders, in Eastern and Western Europe, about their reaction to a pre-emptive strike against Peking's nuclear facilities.

Officials in both agencies are reported to consider the reports as authentic. But some believe that pro-Moscow Communist sources may have deliberately circulated them as part of a psychological-warfare campaign against Peking, rather than as an indication of Moscow's actual military plans.

With border tensions and clashes between the Soviet Union and China rising over recent months, officials here no longer dismiss out of hand the chance that war between the two Communist nations might break out through miscalculation.

All-Out War Doubtful

Nonetheless, Secretary of State William P. Rogers said in a talk with summer internes at the State Department on Aug. 20 that the best judgment of diplomatic specialists was that the border skirmishing would continue but that neither Moscow nor Peking would launch an all-out war.

A State Department spokesman said today that that was still the considered judgment of the department.

Officials said that since Mr. Rogers made his remarks, Washington had picked up more reports of Soviet soundings on the possibility of a Soviet strike against China but that the department was still skeptical that one was likely.

In his talk Secretary Rogers went on to say that the Nixon Administration did not share the view of some Americans "who argue that it would be a good thing for the United States to let the Soviet Union and Communist China engage in a fairly sizable war."

"We don't think so," he said. "We think warfare anywhere is harmful to the total world community, and we think this kind of war would be injurious to all people, and we hope it doesn't occur."

Russ-China scar

Travel subsidies

NEW

Rogers seen trying to play down reported threat of Soviet strike

By R. H. SHACKFORD
Scripps-Howard Staff Writer

Secretary of State William P. Rogers is trying to dampen down what is reported to be a CIA-inspired scare story that Soviet Russia may be thinking about destroying Communist China's nuclear installations with a surprise air strike.

Mr. Rogers and his associates fear that the widely publicized report — the source of which is understood to be Central Intelligence Agency director Richard Helms — will damage the secretary of state's efforts to establish a policy of American neutrality in the Sino-Soviet word and border war.

The White House in California has not been heard from on this latest intra-administration controversy. Nor is it known whether Mr. Rogers feels strongly enough to make an issue of it with President Nixon.

But if it should precipitate a showdown, Mr. Helms is unlikely to carry as much weight with Mr. Nixon as Mr. Rogers, who is an old and close friend of the President.

OTHER COMPLICATIONS

What is most disturbing to State Department officials is that giving even a little credence to the idea of a Soviet pre-emptive strike against China plays into the hands of the Soviet propagandists.

In addition, it could complicate the Nixon-Rogers efforts to work with the Soviets on disarmament, the Middle East and Vietnam if the Kremlin wants a pretext for further delay. The Chinese are expected to regard the report a "proof" that the United States is ganging up with Russia against China, thus thwarting Mr. Rogers' neutrality effort.

For a couple of months Soviet officials have been trying to peddle all kinds of scare stories throughout the world to woo sympathy and support against the Chinese.

A State Department spokesman conceded that there have been "rumors" that the Russians might at some stage "take out" the Chinese nuclear installations. But he added that these have been unconfirmed and come, at best, from second-hand sources.

ANYTHING POSSIBLE

Department officials take the position that anything is possible in the Russian and Chinese worlds. But what is probable is something else.

With that caveat, most of the experts — on both Soviet and Chinese affairs — lean to the theory that the "rumors" of a possible Soviet strike against China are part of Moscow's war of nerves against Peking.

Credibility of the "rumors" of a possible Soviet strike at China's nuclear installations was put into perspective this way by one observer:

"If the Soviet Union is, in fact, planning a surprise attack on China, it is unreasonable to believe that the Kremlin hierarchy would tell low-level officials and authorize them to discuss it with non-Russians."

EXPECTS NO STRIKE

On his recent return from Asia, and after several days of discussion with top U. S. officials in Hong Kong, Mr. Rogers said:

"The best judgment is that probably the Soviets will not use its forces to strike against China, and probably the Chinese will not (strike Russia). The Russians . . . would be faced with a very serious problem if they made a strike . . . then they would be involved in a land war with 800 million Chinese. On the other hand, the Chinese Communists realize that they are not really able militarily to cope with the Soviet Union."

Nevertheless, for many months the Soviet Union has been going to extraordinary lengths to persuade other countries to join them in Moscow's anti-Chinese crusade. On March 29 and June 14, the Soviet government delivered to the State Department written statements giving Russia's versions of the difficulties along the Chinese border.

At his last press conference, Mr. Rogers told of the abnormal diplomatic activities of the Soviets this way:

"The Soviets have gone to embassies all over Western Europe and this hemisphere presenting their case against the Chinese, which is really quite unusual."

Officials explained today that these Russian diplomatic overtures in no way suggested Soviet military action. On the contrary, the Soviets were arguing that they were threatened by the Chinese.

Why the rumors?

The Soviet-Chinese border fights and rumors of a Soviet plan to bomb China's nuclear arsenal may be part of an intricate battle of strategy Moscow hopes will produce a change in

Chinese leadership, according to Dr. Richard C. Thornton, consultant to the State Department on Asian affairs. He offered this analysis of the situation in an interview with United Press International:

- The current border clashes are Soviet "probes" aimed at pressuring China and opening the way for establishment of new, independent border republics in China. Dr. Thornton predicted one to three of these republics, perhaps in Manchuria, Inner Mongolia and Sinkiang, and all controlled by Soviet Puppets, will be established within the next six months.

- As a result, the Soviets have to be prepared to face the threat of a retaliatory attack from Chinese nuclear-tipped missiles which are in the final stages of development. The threat, therefore, that the Soviets might try to knock out the Chinese nuclear missile installations before the Chinese could strike is a real one.

- The Soviets would not want all-out war with China and so would hope the puppet border republics and the pre-emptive nuclear attack, if they decided to risk it, would fragment Chinese leadership. The result could be a civil war, or perhaps the emergence of pro-Soviet forces erased from power during Mao Tse-Tung's proletarian cultural revolution. (UPI)

INTERPRETIVE REPORT

CIA Leaked Story, but Why?

By HENRY S. BRADSHER

Star Staff Writer

A number of similar news stories said yesterday that the Russians might have leaked word they were considering bombing Chinese nuclear installations as a psychological warfare move against Peking.

The stories attributed word of the alleged Soviet thinking to "intelligence reports" or just simply "reports."

None of the dispatches explained what psychological warfare considerations there might be in having word of a possible Soviet pre-emptive strike at China come from Washington.

The motive remained unexplained because CIA Director Richard M. Helms, the source of the news dispatches, does not talk much about why they do things at the Central Intelligence Agency and, apparently, he was not asked.

Rumors of a possible Soviet



RICHARD M. HELMS

attempt to destroy China's nuclear weapons potential before it got too dangerous had been circulating for some time.

The rumors sounded

strangely like echoes of a U.S. discussion two decades ago. Then some "big bomber men" called publicly for the United States to eliminate Soviet nuclear installations before the Soviet Union became dangerously armed with atomic bombs.

Now the Kremlin's version of hawkish generals were rumored to be advising a quick blow against the Chinese gaseous diffusion plant at Lanchow, another plant at Patow, the test site at Lop Nor and other nuclear installations.

The State Department had been hearing such rumors for a couple of months.

It did not put too much importance on them, preferring to believe Moscow is too cautious to do it. Continuing border clashes were one thing, but attacking vital Chinese sites would lead to a bigger, more disastrous war than the Soviets wanted, State Department experts thought.

The State Department even had heard the Russians were checking with allies and friendly Communist parties on what the reaction might be to a pre-emptive strike. It had heard "rumors," meaning unconfirmed reports, a spokesman said, but he added diplomatically that perhaps they were "reports," meaning somewhat more reliable.

John A. Scali, who reports from the State Department for the American Broadcasting Co., arranged for a selected group of diplomatic correspondents to lunch with CIA Director Helms.

From that luncheon Wednesday emerged the stories saying Moscow was checking around on what the reaction would be to a hypothetical strike on Chinese nuclear installations.

"Backgrounder"

The luncheon was held on a "background" basis, meaning that reporters present could not identify the source of their information in their stories. The Star did not have a reporter present, and printed a version of the backgrounder transmitted by United Press International.

The "reports" of what the Soviets might be thinking, said the stories, had come first from Communist party contacts of the CIA in Italy and other West European countries then from Eastern Europe. They were a little vague, coming from sources of varying credibility, according to the news stories.

But the newspaper headlines and the 30-second broadcast summaries focused attention on the possibility of a Soviet pre-emptive strike rather than on the vagueness. There was plenty of attention here and abroad to the stories, with some of the versions going abroad being second-hand dispatches of foreigners uninvited to meet with Helms.

The dispatches faithfully reflected the suggestion that the Russians might be engaging in psychological warfare. There was an implication that Moscow wanted to warn Peking to quit stirring up border trouble—if, in fact, it is the Chinese rather than the Russians who are doing the stirring, which is uncertain from this distance.

So, was the CIA trying to warn Moscow not to strike at China? Was Helms engaged in a little psychological warfare of his own to try to head off an attack which many officials here think would escalate into a war with world-wide repercussions?

"We think this kind of war would be injurious to all people, and we hope it doesn't occur," Secretary of State William P. Rogers said Aug. 20.

Pravda, the Soviet Communist party newspaper, seemed to agree. It repeated yesterday earlier Soviet charges that the Chinese are preparing for war, adding:

"No continent would be left out if a war flares up under the present conditions, with the existing present-day technology, with the availability of the lethal weapons and the means of their delivery."

WASHINGTON POST

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CPYRGHT

PARADE

Q. When the CIA murders men in the line of duty, does the Central Intelligence Agency then make a report to any branch of government on the names and number of enemy agents it has liquidated? For example, does anyone in government know how many men the CIA has liquidated in Vietnam?—
E. T., Baltimore, Md.

A. The CIA knows, but it is not telling. Such information is available to the President, conceivably, to the head of the CIA and only a handful of others.

U.S. IS REVIEWING SPY CAPABILITIES

Assays Prospects if Soviet
Bars On-Site Arms Checks

By WILLIAM BEECKER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 1—The Nixon Administration, as it approaches the start of talks on control of Strategic arms, is conducting an intensive review of all its espionage capabilities to determine what types of accords the nation can live with if on-site inspection cannot be negotiated.

Officials involved in the high-priority study say that while they are not foreclosing the possibility of working out a mutual inspection procedure with the Soviet Union, they would not want to see the talks bog down over that issue.

Consequently, they are attempting to find out with as much precision as possible the extent to which the United States could depend on unilateral means of gathering intelligence to show whether the Russians were abiding by various possible measures on arms limitation.

While stressing that the Administration does not assume that the Russians will cheat, one official insisted that it was only prudent to find out "just how sensitive our intelligence-gathering capabilities are to cheating."

More than 100 analysts at the White House, the State Department, the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency are said to be participating in the review.

Appraisal of Power Balance

The review is focused on what the United States can count on learning from present and proposed spy satellites, eavesdropping planes and ships, radar, Soviet publications and spies and informers.

The study is also attempting to provide President Nixon with an appraisal of whether the strategic balance of power with the Soviet Union is a delicate one, subject to sudden undermining by some determined cheating or is so well-based as to be difficult to upset.

As American officials view it, the key to the current balance is the continuing ability of each nation to deter the other from attacking by possessing sufficient protected missiles and bombers to be able to retaliate overwhelmingly. In this approach offense rather than defense is stressed.

The officials say it is by no means certain that Soviet leaders share that philosophy of strategy. This is expected to be one of the first points to be explored once talks begin on the limitation of strategic arms.

In general terms the United States seeks agreements that would freeze the number and size of intercontinental ballistic missiles, limit the scope of antimissile defenses, limit submarines and limit or even reduce the number of strategic bombers.

Key Areas of Uncertainty

Ranking officials say the study has pinpointed a number of key areas of uncertainty:

¶If the Russians agree to field only a thin antiballistic-missile system, can some of their large number of ground-to-air missiles be surreptitiously upgraded for attacking intercontinental ballistic missiles?

¶Once multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV's) for ICBM's have been successfully tested, is there any way to monitor a ban on their deployment without taking a missile apart at an operational silo? Would either country agree to such "intrusive" inspection?

¶To what extent can spy satellites determine whether the Soviet Union tries to substitute bigger, better ICBM's in existing silos?

¶Can all the spying devices keep track of mobile ICBM's if the latter are not barred completely?

¶If the Russians put all their missile submarine construction under cover, as is not the case at present, could the United States still keep track of new construction?

The officials here point out that it was uncertainty over what the so-called Tallinn system was designed for that led several years ago to the decision to develop and deploy MIRV's, which are meant to overcome a heavy missile defense, thus preserving the American retaliatory capability. The Tallinn system involves ground-to-air missiles, which started appearing in northwestern Russia in 1964.

Many officials thought it was a new antimissile system, but intensive analysis over the years since has convinced them that it is simply a better defense against bombers.

A tentative conclusion of the study is that the balance of power would not be easily upset, the officials say. The United States maintains three strategic systems — Minuteman missiles, Polaris missiles and B-52 bombers — any one of which is believed to be strong enough to cause tens of millions of deaths in a second strike.

"This is the most comprehensive assembly of technical analysis on what we know and don't know in the intelligence field that has ever been done in Government," a high Administration official commented. "We think it will prove invaluable as we enter the drawnout debates over possible agreements with the Russians."

CPYRGHT



Joseph Alsop

Missile Buildup by Soviets Exceeds Worst U.S. Fears

THERE IS much to be learned from a conversation between the chief scientist of the Defense Department, Dr. John Foster, and a scientific colleague who had previously served the department in a high capacity. It was at the time of the ABM fight, and the colleague was a vocal opponent of the ABM.

Foster asked him why he took this stand. The colleague replied, quite unscientifically, that the risk of nuclear weapons being used increased proportionately to the increase in numbers of nuclear weapons. Therefore, he said, the United States ought to take "another kind of risk—unilaterally ceasing to produce this kind of weapons, as a signal to the Soviets," who might then respond to the "signal" by stopping their own production.

Foster pointed out that no respectable Soviet expert in this country predicted any kind of response to such a "signal" except continued Soviet production of nuclear weapons. And Foster added the bleak question:

"So what if your 'risk' goes wrong?"

"Now, Johnnie," the reply came back, "the Soviets can't run this country. There aren't enough of them. We'd just have a different kind of government, that's all."

That ended the conversation. Yet of course the view that risking "a different kind of government" is better than the risks inherent in a reasonable nuclear balance is intellectually respectable, providing all the risks are forthrightly defined. Its forthrightness, in fact, was what made the above-quoted conversation interesting.

What makes the conversa-

tion currently relevant is the frightening deterioration of the nuclear balance in favor of the Soviets. Earlier this year, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and Deputy Secretary David Packard were loudly mocked for warning Congress that the Soviet nuclear program seemed to be aimed for a "first-strike capability," yet they have now been proved a bit overoptimistic.

Before testifying, Laird and Packard had to choose between minimum, medium and maximum estimates of future development of Soviet nuclear missiles. The key estimate concerned the rate of deployment of the giant SS-9 missile, with its triple warhead. The SS-9 is clearly designed for the sole purpose of destroying the Minuteman missiles that constitute the primary American deterrent.

In the interval, unhappily, SS-9 deployment has gone forward just a bit faster than the maximum rate envisioned by Laird and Packard, and there have also been two highly successful additional tests of the SS-9's triple warhead. Deployment of the SS-11 and SS-13 missiles, comparable to our Minuteman, has proceeded apace, too. Launchings of Yankee class submarines, comparable to our Polaris subs, have again exceeded past estimates by a little.

Projecting from these new facts, the Soviets should have enough SS-9s to take out our Minuteman deterrent by the end of 1973. They should also have enough Yankee-class missile submarines to take out our B-52 bases by that time. In addition, they will have a certain number, as yet not estimated, of a new missile with a range of about 3,000 miles, designed for launching at sea against U.S. targets from areas beyond the range of the existing U.S. sea watch system. Their attack submarines, designed to destroy our Polaris submarines, in fact constitute the Soviets' only lag. These last are too slow and too noisy to do their job efficiently.

By the beginning of 1974, meanwhile, our ABM deployment will still be quite inadequate to protect any significant number of our Minuteman missiles. Unless something urgent is done about it, in short, the nuclear balance is going to tilt very sharply against this

That does not mean that by 1974 the Soviets will be ready to consider the first strike their program seems to be aimed for. But it certainly means that the Kremlin will begin to show quite new orders of boldness in all sorts of situations. The first increase of Kremlin boldness is indeed already visible, in the middle Eastern situation explored in the last report in this space.

So this is also a matter for the left wing intellects to weigh, unless they have made the open choice of the scientist above-quoted.

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Spy Refuses to Go Home

Soviet Agent Blocks Swap, Prefers Trial in West

By Antony Terry

London Sunday Times

BONN—The Soviet Union has been rebuffed by one of its own agents in an attempt to arrange a large-scale spy exchange with West Germany. Its offer to barter a group of West German spies under arrest in Moscow for one of its own top operatives, Heinz Suetterlin, was torpedoed by the spy himself.

Suetterlin, a former Berlin photographer turned spy, provided the Soviet espionage organization KGB with a steady flow of more than 50 top-secret NATO plans from the files of West Germany's Foreign Ministry, in addition to about 1,000 other high-grade NATO security documents.

Moscow had sent its chief spy-broker, Wolfgang Vogel, to Bonn to negotiate the exchange. Vogel, 40, one of the few East Berlin private lawyers allowed to practice in Communist East Germany, also acted as intermediary in the negotiations with Britain for the exchange of Soviet spies Peter and Helen Kroger for British lecturer Gerald Brooke.

Feels Safer in West

Suetterlin, who was arrested two years ago and is due to appear in a Cologne court Monday, turned out to be one top Soviet spy who did not want to be released if it meant returning to Moscow.

Recently Suetterlin refused to be sent back to his one-time Russian paymasters. He said that he felt safer if he could stand trial in West Germany, where one of his minor fellow spies has just been sentenced to three years' imprisonment on similar charges.

The West Germans believe that the KGB's offer to exchange a number of German spies for Suetterlin is part of a Soviet plan to take control of their own master spy, Col.

Yevgenii Runge, who defected to America two years ago.

Runge, on whom the Russians have passed a death sentence, gave away his extensive spy network in West Germany—including Suetterlin and his wife, Lore. The latter's position as confidential secretary in the Bonn Foreign Office gave her access to most classified NATO material.

Runge Under Guard

The Russians reportedly believed that, with Suetterlin's help, they could gain information which would lead them to Runge, who is under heavy guard in New York. U.S. security authorities have refused to let Runge go to Germany to testify in court because they believe the Russians have made plans for him to be kidnapped.

Instead the Cologne court, complete with legal staff, will go to New York to take a statement from the former Soviet master spy. The court will hear how 24 rolls of microfilm with photographs of secret NATO and Foreign Office documents were found on Suetterlin when he was arrested in Bonn.

Suetterlin's attractive, raven-haired wife, who had stolen the documents for him, committed suicide in her prison cell. She is said to have been shocked by the discovery that Suetterlin met, seduced and married her on KGB orders because she held a key job in the personnel records department of the Bonn Foreign Office.

Too Efficient as Spies

Her name was one of three given to him by the KGB. All three were secretaries with access to secret documents and Suetterlin was ordered: "Get them into bed, and if possible, marry one of them."

Lore, Suetterlin produced such speed and in such quanti-

ties that both she and her husband came under KGB suspicion of being double agents working also for the West German intelligence service. They were temporarily "withdrawn from active service" while the Russians made secret inquiries as to how the Suetterlins were able to transmit details of highly classified documents before they even reached the desk of Bonn's Foreign Minister.

Runge, who was also under Soviet suspicion of playing a double game, defected to the West and, according to U.S. security authorities, he "sang like a prize canary." Among

other things revealed by the former KGB colonel, who was Suetterlin's spymaster, was extreme laxity in West German government departments' han-

dling of top-secret and classified NATO plans.

Between them, Runge and the Suetterlins provided the Russians with a complete pic-

ture of all major NATO and Western defense plans during several years. These included long-range plans of the West German armed forces until

1972, the location of secret NATO missile centers throughout Western Europe and NATO's evacuation blueprint in case of war.

Overseas Cuts Spare Intelligence Men

By TAD SZULC

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 13—United States intelligence services—notably the Defense Department's agencies—have won exemptions for thousands of their personnel from an order by President Nixon to reduce by 10 per cent the number of American officials serving abroad.

Most of these exemptions cover the Pentagon's intelligence and psychological-warfare operations in East Asia, in which a total of 28,000 Americans are engaged.

The military intelligence exemptions, along with smaller ones for other Government agencies, represented overseas, were granted by the White House.

Approval came despite State Department recommendations that a study of further cuts in intelligence operations abroad be undertaken "by leaders independent of the intelligence community under the aegis of the national policy level."

Among the major agencies, only the State Department has fully accepted its share of the cuts—517 of 5,166 positions abroad.

Under Secretary of State Elliot L. Richardson served as chairman of the National Security Council's permanent committee of under secretaries, which was charged with carrying out the President's "Operation Reduction."

He noted in a report to Mr. Nixon that under the Defense Department exemptions "the military psychological-warfare units" would assume "a disproportionate role in comparison to civilians."

The Richardson report, which has not been made public, was obtained from high Administration quarters.

President Nixon ordered "Operation Reduction," known in Federal jargon as OPRED, on July 9.

Mr. Richardson's report was sent to the White House on Oct. 3.

On Nov. 26, the White House announced that the

President had ordered home 14,937 American military personnel and the elimination of 5,100 overseas civilian jobs held by Americans, 10 per cent of whom are Foreign Service officers.

This is to be effective on June 30, 1970 with a saving of \$50-million a year.

The White House said that the order excluded troops in Southeast Asia, South Korea and Berlin and those in Europe under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Subject to the cut in the military field, therefore, were the 144,889 Defense Department personnel, of whom 39,381 were civilians.

The total military strength of the United States abroad is about 1.7 million.

In addition, the Defense Department employs 324,682 foreign citizens abroad. The Richardson group is to make recommendations by Dec. 31 on reducing foreign employees. Total employment of foreigners abroad by all the Government agencies is 351,694.

Strictly speaking, the Defense Department is making a 10 per cent cut in both its military and civilian personnel abroad. But the distribution of the cuts, left to the department's discretion, maintained abroad intelligence and psychological-warfare personnel in numbers that the Richardson report considered as highly excessive.

On the other hand, the Central Intelligence Agency was reported to have reduced its American personnel abroad by between 10 and 12 per cent. It is believed that the agency employs 30,000 foreigners abroad, directly or indirectly.

The Richardson report said that 28,000 Americans, mainly Defense Department personnel, are engaged in intelligence activities in East Asia.

Under its interpretation of a July 21 directive to Mr. Richardson from Henry A. Kissinger, the President's Special Assistant for National Security, the Pentagon was able to exempt 12,000 of the 28,000 intelligence personnel in East Asia from the cuts. This meant that only 1,600 instead of 2,800

the reduction in the intelligence staffs in East Asia were only 6.4 per cent instead of 10 per cent.

Mr. Richardson's report commented that although the intelligence community as a whole had complied with the 10 per cent cut, he believed there were "intelligence activities which can probably stand further reductions without a real detriment."

The report discussed the feasibility of alternative systems of collecting intelligence following the closure or consolidation of some activities, including the establishment of mobile operations in the United States and "closely allied countries."

A joint C.I.A.-State Department subcommittee was charged with the "reconsideration of the role of intelligence collection organizations overseas" operating under Washington's direct guidance or under foreign control points.

It was in this context that Mr. Richardson proposed the independent study of intelligence operations under "the aegis of the national policy level"—meaning the National Security Council.

U. S. I. A. Is Involved

The Richardson report further found fault with the Pentagon's insistence on maintaining the level of its psychological warfare operations in Asia. These are coordinated with the C.I.A. and receive "general policy guidance" from the United States Information Agency. The information agency's legal mandate, incidentally, does not provide for involvement in psychological warfare in war theaters.

These operations are chiefly aimed at Communist China, North Vietnam and North Korea and include radio broadcasts, leaflet drops and the dissemination of written pamphlets "through other means."

The Richardson report said, "In Southeast Asia and Korea, civilian agencies are reducing the level of operations, but the Department of Defense does not plan to reduce the level of psychological warfare operations."

"Since the policy trend is in the direction of reducing the level of psychological warfare operations in the area, it does not appear fully consistent with that trend for the Department of Defense to exclude its units from any reduction on the technicality of the White House directive."

"As a consequence of exemptions, the military psycho-

logical warfare units will assume a disproportionate role in comparison to civilians," it said.

Mr. Richardson then cited a number of examples of military and intelligence operations abroad that may be eliminated or reduced.

He urged the elimination of the Voice of the United Nations Command, a radio station in South Korea run by the United States military.

Its liquidation has been recommended by the American Embassy in Seoul.

Mr. Richardson noted that 1,950 American employees, mainly military, operate a highly secret intelligence operation in

Ethiopia and that the Pentagon has exempted the entire staff, although "it is in our interest to reduce our profile as much as we can."

He said that there had been only 4 per cent reduction in two military intelligence stations in Morocco, where 1,700 Americans, chiefly military, are employed.

The Richardson committee also asked the Defense Department to re-examine the need for a separate unified command in the Panama Canal Zone, which has 12,000 Americans.

The report remarked that in 1967, the Panamanian Government only "with the greatest reluctance" agreed to let the

United States continue using the Canal Zone for military training and "liaison" with Latin America.

In addition to Panama Canal defenses, the command is responsible for planning and controlling "military contingency

operations" in Central America and South America.

The special report due on Dec. 31 is to suggest alternatives, such as moving the command to the continental United States, presumably Florida, or to Puerto Rico.